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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
This appeal is from the judicial decisions of the Court
entered by the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, Disrict Judge,
denying defendants1 claims for trial and determination of the
claimed public need and necessity, the right for the jury to
determine the fair market value of underlying mineral rights in
the property, the right to present evidence of the fair market
value of access permits for hunting rights, the right for assessment of attorneys' fees and costs for abandonment of claims, and
the proper taxing of costs, and therefore, an appeal from the
special jury verdict which was based upon those judicial decisions in the case of Cornish Town v. Evan 0. Roller and Marlene
B. Roller, Civil No. 25058, First Judicial District Court, Cache
County, State of Utah.

This Court has jurisdiction of this

appeal under Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(i) (1987).

Rule

3(a).
THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This action is a condemnation proceeding in which the
town of Cornish sought to acquire approximately 100 acres of
defendants1 property in fee simple and approximately 7 acres of
defendants1 property in esements for rights-of-way and access to
the springs.

The property was acquired as alleged protection

zones above the Griffiths and Pearsons Springs which are located
on defendants1 property.

Defendants appeal from decisions made
-1-

by the Court which materially and substantially affected the
issues submitted to the Jury for Special Verdict.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented on appeal include whether defendants have a right to a trial and determination of (1) the issues
of public need and necessity, (2) the issues of the fair market
value of the underlying mineral interests, (3) the issues of the
right to produce evidence of the fair market value of access permits for hunting rights, (4) the issues of an award of appropriate costs and attorneys1 fees for the plaintiff's abandonment of
claims, and (5) the issues for award of claimed costs of trial.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The relevant statutory and constitutional provisions on
appeal are:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4.

78-34-4.

This Section states:

Conditions precedent to taking.

Before property can be taken it must appear:
(1) That the use to which it is to be
applied is a use authorized by law;
(2) That the taking is necessary to such
use;. . .
(Emphasis added)
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1987).

This Section

states:
78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action Deposit paid into court - Procedure for payment of
compensation.
-2-

The plaintiff may move the court or a judge
thereof, at any time after the commencement of
suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the state, or has appeared by attorney in
the action, otherwise by serving a notice directed
to him on the clerk of the court, for an order
permitting the plaintiff to occupy the premises
sought to be condemned pending the action, including appeal, and to do such work thereon as may be
required. . . .
3.

Utah Code Ann. S 78-34-2.

This Section

states:
78-34-2.

Estates and rights that may be taken.

The following is a classification of the
estates and rights in lands subject to be taken
for public use;
(1) A fee simple, when taken for public
buildings or grounds or for permanent buildings,
for reservoirs and dams and permanent flooding
occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow,
or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings
of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the
reduction of ores, or for solar evaporation ponds
and other facilities for the recovery of minerals
in solution; provided that where surface ground is
underlaid with minerals, coal or other deposits
sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, only
a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface
ground for such deposits.
(2)

An easement, when taken for any other

use.
(3) The right of entry upon, and occupation
of lands, with the right to take therefrom such
earth, gravel, stones, trees and timber as may be
necessary for some public use.
(Emphasis added)
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1987).

tion states:
-3-

This Sec-

78-34-10.
assessed.

Compensation and damages - How

The court, jury or referee must hear such
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must
ascertain and assess:
(1) The value of the property sought to be
condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate
estate or interest therein; and if it consists of
different parcels, the value of each parcel and of
each estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed,
(2) If the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the
damages which will accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
(3) If the property, though no part thereof
is taken, will be damaged by the construction of
the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages. . . .
(Emphasis added)
5.

Utah Code Ann. S 78-34-16 (1987).

This Sec-

tion states:
78-34-16. Occupancy of premises pending action Substitution of bond for deposit paid into court Abandonment of action by condemner.
In the event that no order is entered by the
court permitting payment of said deposit on
account of the just compensation to be awarded in
the proceeding within thirty (30) days following
its deposit, the court may, on application of the
condemning authority, permit the substitution f a
bond in such amount and with such sureties as
shall be determined and approved by the court.
Condemner, whether a public or private body, may,
at any time prior to final payment of compensation
and damages awarded the defendant by the court or
-4-

juryf abandon the proceedings and cause the action
to be dismissed, without prejudice, provided, however, that as a condition of dismissal condemner
first compensate condemnee for all damages he has
sustained and also reimburse him in full for all
reasonable and necessary expenses actually
incurred by condemnee because of the filing of the
action by condemner, including attorney's fees.
(Emphasis added)
6.

Utah Constitution, Art. I, S 7.

This consti-

tutional provision states in relevant part:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.
7.

Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 22. This consti-

tutional provision states in relevant part:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.
8.

Town of Cornish Ordinances 81-1 (R. 431),

83-1 (R. 435), 85-1 (R. 441).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action is a proceeding in condemnation by
Cornish Town to condemn approximately 100 acres of defendants1 property for the purpose of creating protection zones
above two springs located on defendants' property and to
provide rights-of-way and access to the springs.
I.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BEFORE THE LOWER
COURT.
The Town of Cornish filed this action in July, 1986,

seeking to condemn defendants' property in fee simple (Ordinance
-5-

85.4, Tr. at 1) through the statutory power of eminent domain,
the property taken surrounds two springs in which both parties
hereto have an interest.

In its complaint (R. at 1 ) , the Town of

Cornish claimed a right to obtain defendants1 property in fee
simple.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint sought the same fee simple

interests. (R. at 344)

Defendants1 Answer and Ninth Affirmative

Defense and defendants1 Third Cause of Action in Counterclaim
allege the value of the land and consequential damages to the
taking are valuable rights in the land that plaintiff sought to
condemn. (R. at 31)

The Town of Cornish filed a Motion for Imme-

diate Occupancy of the property on July 29, 1986.

(R. at 11)

On

October 8, 1986, following three days of hearing during which the
plaintiff put on evidence of

of a public need and necessity, the

trial court refused to consider any evidence of defendants
refutinging the prima facia claim of public need and necessity
and entered an Order of Immediate Occupancy on December 16, 1986.
(R. at 137)

The Order of Occupancy contained no legal descrip-

tions of the rights-of-way acquired and two subsequent motions to
amend Complaint and a first amended complaint provided descriptions of the property to be acquired through eminent domain.

The

Order for Immediate Occupancy also included the claim of the
plaintiff for the taking of the property in fee simple.

Defen-

dants objected to the Order as to the taking in fee simple.
at 69)

(R.

In the proceedings for immediate occupancy, the specific

question was asked if the plaintiff demanded fee simple including
-6-

all oil rights, and the response was that the purposes for which
the property was condemned would be frustrated if the plaintiff
could not obtain fee simple to the property including all mineral
rights thereto.

(R. at 469-470)

Thereafter, defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. at 416) to determine that the date of taking of
property condemned was September, 1981 at the time the town ordinance 81-1 (R. 431) was
579)

enacted.

That motion was denied. (R. at

Defendants prepared their defense and burden of proof of

their claim of greater value for trial based upon the Complaint
and Order of Immediate Occupancy in which plaintiff demanded and
was exercising its claimed right to take the property in fee simple. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 15)
In presentation of plaintiff's case, the Trial Court
made preliminary orders prior to the opening statements of the
parties which prohibited defendants from putting on evidence
refuting the claims of public need and necessity; and prohibited
defendants from putting on any evidence concerning the fair market value of the mineral rights underlying the property taken.
Defendants1 offer of proof as to mineral rights (R. at 591) and
R. at 602 and Tr. Vol. 1 at 15 and Vol. 11 at 10)

During trial,

the Court prohibited defendants from putting on evidence as to
the fair market value of access permits for hunting; after trial
the Court denied defendants1 claim for attorney's fees and costs
appropriate when plaintiff abandoned its claim for fee simple and
-7-

refused to allow defendants1 claim to tax appropriate costs
incurred in this proceeding.
The jury was instructed to make its findings without
any consideration for the above referenced matters, and therefore
the jury special verdict was inappropriate and incomplete.
Final Judgment on special jury verdict and a taking of
perpetual easements and rights-of-way was entered by the District
Court on May 13, 1988 (R. at 131) and Amended Final Judgment was
entered June 13, 1988 (R. at 494).
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff brought this action in condemnation pursuant

to Statutory Power of Eminent Domain, claiming a public need and
necessity to acquire lands belonging to the Defendants in fee
simple for public use for the following purposes:
(1)

Additional access easements to two separate

springs situated on defendants1 property in which plaintiff has a
partial interest and to which plaintiff has had access easement
since the inception of the town's interests in the springs.
(2)

Sites for reservoirs and chlorinators.

(3)

Extensive protection zones above each spring

including approximately 50 acres of land in each protective zone.
(R. at 1)
Defendants contested plaintiff's claim of public need
and necessity for the acquisition of the land for the protection
zones and contested issues relative to fair market value of the
-8-

property and the damages to be paid to the defendants for the
property taken in condemnation. (R. at 31)
Upon filing Complaint, plaintiff filed a Motion for an
Order of Immediate Occupancy. (R. at 11)

At the hearing held

October 8-12f 1986, the defendants raised the issues of whether
or not the claimed public use was authorized by law, whether the
taking was necessary to the use, whether the total of the land
taken was necessary or should have included substantially more
property, and whether the taking required a taking of title in
fee simple, which included the claimed taking of all mineral
rights to the property.
The evidence, as presented by Cornish Town, to these
issues was (1) the town needed the protection zones to control
nitrates in the water; (2) the town had received an opinion that
nitrates in Cornish1 water supply were there by reason of agricultural fertilization.

(Hearing Tr. at 13 & 14). The town

admitted that the report was the only source of information
relied upon by the town and that the town had conducted no independent tests.

(Hearing Tr. at 32)

The Department of Health for the State of Utah, by letter to Cornish Town advised the town that these springs used by
Cornish for culinary water "may be relatively shallow sources of
water and it may be impossible to develop them" (Exh. 2 ) , yet the
town admitted that there was no necessity to make additional
tests to determine whether the springs could be made into a
-9-

culinary water systems (Tr. at 49). The town did not have, at
the time of the hearing nor at the time of trial, any state
approval of their plans for the construction of new water collection lines.

(Hearing Tr. at 49 and at 109). During the course

of the testimony, defendants raised issues of a public need and
necessity to take fee simple title to a protection zones above
the two springs when there was no showing that the source of the
nitrates was the defendants1 fertilization program (Hearing Tr.
at 37), or, that control of a 1500 feet radius of property above
the springs by the city would reduce the nitrates in the water
(Hearing Tr. at 36).
There is no State requirement that a 1500 feet radius
above the spring need be taken as a protection zone (Hearing Tr.
at 36). The City Engineer estimated that only 1,090 feet need to
be taken (R. at 775 & Hearing Tr. at 82). The amount of land to
be taken was arbitrarily increased by the Mayor, not as a public
necessity, but rather the Mayor stated the additional acreage was
to "accommodate" Mr. Roller.

(Hearing Tr. at 93).

Defendants raised the issues of public necessity of
spending public funds, as it was arbitrary and a waste of public
funds to purchase protection zones where there was no evidence
that the acquisition of the protection zones would affect the
nitrate content of the water.

(Hearing Tr. at 72 and following).

Defendants challenged the issue of the public necessity
to take the property in fee simple title.
-10-

Cornish admitted that

the town had entered into an agreement with an adjoining landowner, who owned property within the 1500 foot radius above the
Griffiths spring, (Exhibit 14) where the town executed a 20-year
agreement in which the land owner
property.

agreed not to fertilize his

This agreement was acceptable to the town (Hearing Tr.

at ) and the State of Utah (Hearing Tr. at 129), yet the town
sought to take fee simple title to defendants' property without
ever offering to defendants such an arrangement.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony, defendants moved to dismiss upon the following grounds: (1) the town
did not show with any degree of certainty that it had a public
need and necessity for the protection zones; (2) There was no
showing of public necessity to take fee simple title to the land
for nitrates; (3) The size of the zone was increased arbitrarily
from 1,090 radius feet above the spring to 1,500 feet radius; and
(4)

The town failed to show any public need for the property

taken when other alternative sites with substantially greater
potential to develop water for the town were available.

The

Trial Court denied the motion stating:
"As to the site and the amount included in the
site is not for the courts to decide. That's for
the condemnor to decide as long as they act reasonably and in good faith." (Hearing Tr. at 981)
Defendants proceeded to introduce evidence to the Court concerning the lack of necessity and good faith:

-11-

(1)

The State has not determined the amount of land

necessary to protect this water supply (Hearing Tr. at 110) nor
whether the water claimed by Cornish is ground water or surface
water (surface water requires a greater treatment, and, therefore, greater expenditure of public funds). (Hearing Tr. at 128)
(2)

The nitrate level in the Cornish water made rede-

velopment of the springs a questionable investment.

(Hearing Tr.

at 150).
(3)

Cornish should have the area examined in an

attempt to determine the recharge area of the springs so that the
areas could be controlled (Hearing Tr. at 157), and a decision
made as to how much land for a protection zone was necessary.
(Hearing Tr. at 166).
(4)

The soils were poor aquifers (Hearing Tr. at 29)

subject to contamination from the surface (Hearing Tr. at 210),
the probable source of nitrates was agriculture (Hearing Tr. at
211), but that additional tests had to be made in order to determine the source of the nitrates in the water supply.

(Hearing

Tr. at 212).
(5)

The source of the nitrates in the water would have

to be determined in order to designate the amount of the land
necessary to provide protection to the springs.

(Hearing Tr. at

214).
(6)

No evidence was provided to show that the condem-

nation of the approximate 50 acres above each spring was going to
-12-

reduce the nitrates in the soil, nor reduce the nitrates in the
springs. (Hearing Tr. at 250).
(7)

Core samples were drilled and dye tests conducted

in the area sought to be condemned.

It was determined the

recharge area for the Griffiths Spring is 200 acres and the
recharge area for the Pearson Spring is 650 acres.

(Hearing Tr.

at 328).
(8)

Dye tests determine that the source of the Cornish

water was in fact surface water.

(Hearing Tr. at 334). Dye

placed outside of the protection zones indicated that the area
sought to be condemned was not the only recharge area of the
springs.

The recharge area of the springs could not be reduced

into a smaller area from the 200 acres for Griffiths Spring and
650 acres for Pearson Springs.
(9)

(Hearing Tr. at 350)

The major source of water flowing into the Pearson

Spring was from snow drifts outside of the area condemned by Cornish and that only a very small quantity of water originated
within the protection zone, and, therefore, Cornish1 attempt to
condemn lands did not encompass the point of origination of the
water, nor the point of origination of the claimed contamination.
(Hearing Tr. at 369)
(10)

The nitrogen in the soil is fixed by algae.

The

amount of nitrogen added to the soil by the algae is more than
twice the amount applied in fertilizer.

-13-

The amount of fertilizer

put on the land by defendants was less than the total that the
crop consumed. (Hearing Tr. at 373)
(11)

Letting the land lay dormant will not cause a

reduction in nitrates, and, therefore, the taking of the land by
Cornish in protection zones will not result in upgrading the
city's water supply (Hearing Tr. at 378).
(12)

If the condemnation proceeds and the town takes

the land out of production, nitrate levels will not decrease as
the soil is a large reservoir of potential nitrates from natural
organic sources.

(Hearing Tr. at 408).

Defendants offered Cornish the use of pre-existing
roads to the springs in lieu of the condemnation proceedings on
farmland.

(Tr. 248). Cornish rejected the offer and condemned

farmland for new roads.

Defendants testified that if the city

did not need to take fee title to the land, defendant offered to
withhold portions of his land from fertilization.

(Hearing Tr.

at 266) .
Following the conclusion of the evidence the Trial
Court indicated in its decision as follows:
This court is
or expediency
property, and
and re-quotes

not to inquire into the use or necessity
or the appropriateness of the particular
the court quotes that as a quote of case
it again in the Fuller case.

They have also stated in the Fuller case that in view
of the general grant of authority carries no limitation
by implication. In either case the necessity is for
the condemnor and is not for the courts to decide, and
the decision of the condemnor is final as long as it
acts reasonably and in good faith. (Hearing Tr. at 482)
-14-

The Trial Court denied all of the defendants1 motions
and requests.

In doing so, the Court abrogated its duty in stat-

ing that:
They have reviewed and selected this method and I do
not find from the evidence that they acted unreasonably
or that they acted in bad faith in doing so. I don't
pass on their judgment as to its appropriateness
because that is not within the prerogative of this
court to do so. (Hearing Tr. at 484)
After the commencement of the trial and the selection
of the jury had been completed and before opening statements were
made by the parties, defendants made proffers of proof to the
Court that they intended to request that the jury make a determination of the fair market value of the underlying minerals of the
property. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 1)
an immediate market value.

The minerals are zeolite, that has
In addition, there was a ready market

for the mineral (Tr. Vol. 1 at 17), and that defendants had prepared a portion of their case with extensive legal costs and the
preparation of expert witnesses to present testimony as to the
fair market value of the underlying minerals.

Defendants made

proffer that the minerals could not be extracted without removal
of the overburden, being the surface soil. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 8)
Plaintiff then moved to amend their complaint to abandon their
claim for a taking of the fee simple interest to the property and
to make claim for a perpetual easement only. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 7)
The Court granted the motion to amend complaint and

denied

defendants1 rights to put on evidence as to the fair market value
-15-

of the underlying mineral interest. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 15)

The Court

stated: "I don't see any of us will in our lifetime ever see any
bulldozer or anything out there . . . I'll believe it when I see
it." (Tr. Vol. Ill at 10)

Without considering any evidence, the

Court indicated that the basis for its ruling was its own opnion
that there was no mineral value in defendants1 property.

That

decision forced defendants to carry the burden of proof as to
claimed interests for perpetual easements that were never raised
until the date of trial.
Defendants then petitioned that the Court hear evidence
as to the claims of public need and necessity of the property
being condemned. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 10)

The Court denied that motion

saying that all issues as to public need and necessity were presented by the plaintiff in a prima facie case, and that the Court
had no right to determine whether there was a public need and
necessity, and therefore denied defendants1 request for any findings or determination of the issues of public need and necessity.
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 10)
During the trial, defendants attempted to put on evidence as to the fair market value of the retail cost of access
permits for hunting purposes for the deer herd that exists on
defendants1 property.

The Court denied defendants the right to

put on that evidence, stating that since defendants had not sold
any hunting access permits prior to the date of taking, they
could not claim that hunting access permits would increase the
-16-
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of the property within a two-mile radius of the town's water
supply.From the commencement of this action, the town intended
to claim fee simple title to the property which included a claim
for mineral rights.

The mineral interests in the property cannot

be mined without removal of the soil overburden.

Removal of the

mineral interests would not support the surface right.

The

defendants have a right to the fair market value of the mineral
3/
rights condemned by the town.The town was granted leave to amend its complaint to
abandon its claim for fee simple title to the property and to
claim a perpetual easement to the property.

The abandonment and

dismissal of that claim gives rise to an award to defendants of
all attorney's fees, expenses and costs incurred in preparing
their claims for greater value of the claims for condemnation of
fee simple interests which included the mineral rights to the
land.-7
The value of access permits for hunting of the deer
herd on defendants' property was proper evidence of the value of

2/
Nollan v. California Coastal Commn., 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (U.S.
Sup. Ct. June, 1987) and First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (U.S.
Sup.Ct. June, 1987)
2/
Wm. E. Russell Coal Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of
Boulder County, 270 P.2d 772 (Colo., 1954)
i/
Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 483 P.2d 1 (Cal.,
1971).
-18-
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WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE
LAW WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC NEED AND DETERMINATION OF NECESSITY.
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The standard is whether, reviewing the record as a
whole and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of defendants, is plaintiff entitled to a judgment of public need and
necessity as a matter of law.

National American Life Ins. Co. v.

Bayou Country Club, Inc., 403 P.2d 26 (Utah, 1965).
The Trial Court abrogated its responsibility in a condemnation proceeding when it stated that the court would not substitute its judgment for that of the town as to the determination
of public need and necessity.

The town had reviewed and selected

the method chosen for the improvement of its water supply and the
court did not find from the plaintiff's evidence that they acted
unreasonably, in bad faith or arbitrarily.
2.

A determination at law of public need and

necessity.
Two Utah cases are particularly pertinent to these
issues.

The first is Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182

(Utah 1977) where this Court said as follows:
The power of eminent domain is not to be exercised
thoughtlessly or arbitrarily and the courts possess
full authority to determine the proper limit of the
power to prevent abuses in its exercise and litigants
should and do have great latitude in conferring the
positive functions upon the court as they clearly did
in this instance. The question of necessity of the
taking is the functional perrogative of the judicial
system and that principle of law is stated in Nichols
on eminent domain.
In every case, therefore, there is a judicial question
whether the taking is of such a nature that it is or
may be founded on public necessity.
-20-

The second is the case of Utah State Road Commission v.
Friberq et a.3 ., 687 P.2d 82] U It , ih 1 91 M ) wher e thi s Coi lr t - M O :
We turn fi rst to the issue of the legal effect of the • •
order of immediate occupancy. In a condemnation proceeding the state has the burden of coming forth with
the evidence of, and the burden or persuasion to establish his right to condemn. The state must prove that
the taking of the property is necessary and that the
property will be dedicated to a public use. (With
citations) .
ln

Exi^exg the State contended that the ri ght

d emnwasfixFfjv.
The Supreme M.^U

>•

» >

to con. -

- :«11 i a t e ::: • c c u p a i I :::) i s e i 11 e r e d ,

><3 1 U <

i t t he c o n d e m n o r * s author i i ^ t..-. - >noemr; , ^ cha 1 *. ^ M C M - p r i m a facia s h o w i n g o f t h e right M O :ondemn must c>
m a d e to support a n d o r d e r of i m m e d i a t e l y o c c u p a n c y ,
H o w e v e r , a p r i m a f a c i a s h o w i n g of t h p
^\^hnr\ta f i n d ! d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y .
A n o r d n - ,M ..'<m e^. . ji.e ^.. ipancy is a n o r d e r e n t e r e d
p e n d e n t e lite a n d only a u t h o r i z e s t h e s t a t e to t a k e
i m m e d l a t e p o s s e s s i o n unt i1 a f lna 1 a d j u d i c a t i o n of t h e
m e r i t <*
T h e S t a t e ' s right to condemn if c h a l l e n g e d can f i n a l l y
b e d e t e r m i n e d o n l y after a trial o n t h e m e r i t s -. a
hearina on the moMon for immediate ocnm^nrv,
e Ramose^ 11 case, supra, tl le T'r-rM Court stated as
follows:
At the conclusioi i of tl le trial the Court made its findings which generally stated that any use of the premises was uncertain indefinite, speculative and not
within the reasonably foreseeable future. Based
thereon it concluded that the plaintiff had failed i i i
its burden of proving need or public necessity and that
the attempted condemnation \ •• tear abusive
discretion,
jeiendants contend that the trial court refused to consider there has never been a determination made by the State of
Utah that the springs were ground water or surface water. The
-21-

size of the protection zone necessary to meet the supposed needs
of the town was never determined based on the town's claims that
the protection zones were necessary to control nitrates.
Finally, the Court did not determine whether the taking of fee
simple title was necessary.
The Trial Court abrogated its function as a court when
it said as follows:
The degree of necessity or the extent to which the
property will advance the public purpose the courts
have nothing to do with. That is not the role of the
court. When the use is public the necessity or expediency of the appropriation of the particular property is
not subject of judicial cognizance.
This Court is not to inquire into the use or necessity
or expediency or the appropriateness of particular
property and the court quotes that as a court of a case
and re-quotes it again in the Fuller case. (Tr. at
454).
And further,
That there is sufficient testimony to show the necessity of something being done by Cornish to do something
to their water supply so they can meet the requirements
of the state as far as adequate and pure water supply.
(Tr. at 460)
The court granted the order of immediate occupancy in violation
of the law as set forth in State v. Friberg, supra, page 832
where the court held that the State must prove that the taking of
that the property is necessary and the property will be dedicated
to public use.

In Ramoselli, supra, page 143, the court held

that the question of necessity of the taking is a functional prerogative of the judicial system.

In Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons &

Sons Co., 602 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah, 1979), the court held:
The duty of determining the necessity of a proposed
taking, the necessity must be established by evidence
or the proceeding fails. Necessity does not signify
impossibility of constructing the improvement for which
the power has been granted without the taking of the
-22-
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the purpose of protecting the water supply would have to be
determined. (Hearing Tr. at 214)
The flow of the springs was unknown by Cornish after
the development, and, therefore, the economic expenditure versus
the public good was unknown by Cornish.

It was submitted by

defendants throughout the entire hearing that these expenditures
of the money were not in the best interest of the public, taking
into consideration the costs of acquisition of the land.

(Hear-

ing Tr. at 101). The Trial Court's finding that there was sufficient testimony to show the necessity of something being done by
Cornish, to do something to their water supply simply shows the
court's inability to articulate a necessity to do a specific act
to achieve a specific public purpose.
That criteria fails to meet the criteria established by
the Supreme Court in the case of Ramoselli, supra, where the
Trail Court reviewed the law as cited before herein and stated:
Briefly stated the evidence at trial was that no
defined plans had been adopted or approved, that no
time frame of use within the reasonably foreseeable
future had been determined, despite the fact that a
voluntary acquisition of nearby property for public use
some six years prior had not as yet been placed to its
intended purpose, and that no funds had been requested,
budgeted, appropriated or were presently in existence
to place the property in question to use.
The plaintiff's failures to determine whether or not
the water in question is surface or ground water, what treatment
will be necessary and the cost of that treatment, the flows which
will be anticipated from the improved springs areas versus the
-24-
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to "ontest eh-1

1

power to condemn in the plenary proceedings is not prohibited by
the rules of res adjudicata.

Just as the right was reserved by

the Friebergsf defendants in the instant case reserve the right.
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 10 and at 91-98) where the issue of necessity was
specifically raised by the defendants.

Defendants were denied

the right to put the issue before the jury and made an offer of
proof to the court relative to such issues.

(Tr. Vol. 1 at 92).

The only issue submitted by the Court to the jury was the issue
of the value of the property taken.
Defendants were entitled to have the jury hear evidence
and determine the issue of public need and necessity as such
issues related to the question of good faith, waste of public
funds, public need and necessity, abuse of discretion and use of
the premises for uncertain indefinite and speculative reasons,
and to determine the size of protective zones and the problems
with the determination that the springs are surface water or
ground water.
Ill
WHETHER PLAINTIFF IS LIABLE FOR TAKING OF DEFENDANTS1
PROPERTY BY RESTRICTIVE ORDINANCE.
Defendants have profitably dry farmed their property.
For many years, applying herbicides, pesticides and fertilizers
to their property to obtain maximum yields from their farming
practices.

-26-
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On July 29, 1986, plaintiff served upon defendants a
Summons and Complaint pursuant to powers of eminent domain, condemning in fee simple approximately 100 acres of defendants1
property for a protective zone above the springs which were
sources of part of the town's water supply and for access roads
thereto.
On August 1, 1987, plaintiff postponed the enforcement
of Ordinance No. 85-1, ostensibly for the reason that the condemnation proceeding was pending and resolution of this action would
give plaintiff the right to impose or abandon the ordinance.
In June, 1988, plaintiff passed Ordinance 88-1, repealing Ordinance 85-1, "in its entirety."
In each of the ordinances described above, defendants
were restricted from using fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides on their property, from keeping or grazing livestock on
their property, and from using their property for human habitation.

If defendants were prohibited from the right to use herbi-

cides and pesticides on their soil, it becomes infested with
weeds and cannot be used to cultivate crops.

Without the right

for application of fertilizers, the property quickly becomes
depleted and will not yield a profitable crop.

The only remain-

ing beneficial use of the property would be grazing of livestock,
and the ordinance prohibited that use.
hibited by those ordinances from

Plaintiff has been pro-

all beneficial or economically

-28-

viable

^ ordinances

-decreased
I."

t h e v a l u e 01

-

UNDER STATE L A TO COMPENSATION

A-

sp<

F THE DATE

*

in H . ' . n e n i
:.*r»-

. .

-

r.

,^ol.

DEFENDANTS

oantdiges f o r

-« J ,<

just

com-

. ^ .•»;.-* =
• • »• .- *

< Ut ah Code A

4

ordinance,

A.

• -*.- -

-'M^CTMENT.

iv^ssmerv

aonia;n j. : .

' '^in.i.

>

d a t e -.-I t a k i n g
restrictive

^

i NANCE K - l E N T I T L E S

;-• •
pensation

; ,>iopert. ;

have m a t e r i a l I T

w

..

- - effective

d a t e „>i i e

De.nq S e p t ejjiL/t. , , - r l -

To vaxue defendants' Properry on the Date Process
Was Served Is to Deny Just Compensation.
3f< 4 - r<it U t a h Code Ann,

S 78-34-11-'
i

*- f .^-i-,

creates

7

' ,a¥\f^^

* ' e t i u U a t i ^ preium^
s^.'

h** t h e d a t e

Utah State Road Lonmi^sio:: ._ .__ ±jL±j^±:
198'

for
.r s e : v i c e

*

-

Ci

: ui'u-e^s,

'

" ">

-^ar ,

,T,

^a* - resumpt JL :>:; J-• rebutted "by a sho*^.^ ......
ai

awar-j tridt

# ,. : not p i u v i a t

j . ^ s t compei

Id. at ojfc.

2/

Sectior
When right co damages deemed to have accrued. F
purpose of assessing compensation and damages,
;
right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the
date of the service of summons, and its actual value dL
that date shall be the measure of compensation for all
property to be actually taken, and the basis of damages
to property not actually taken, but injuriously
affected, in all cases where such damages arc
-,
as orovided ^ ' r>e next prPc^Mrm section.
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In Friberqy process was served seven years before the
state proceeded to a final decree.

In the intervening years, the

Friberg property appreciated in value.

The Supreme Court held

that the Fribergs would not be justly compensated by valuing
their property as of the date of service because "the difference
in valuation of defendants1 property between the date of service
of summons and the date when the right to condemn was settled is
evident and significant."

j[d. at 835.

The Friberg case establishes a two-pronged test to
rebut the presumption that damages accrue at service of summons:
(1) the unfairness of valuing the property at service of process
must be evident, and (2) the difference in value must not be
insignificant.
B.

Ld. at 831.

It Is Unfair for the Plaintiff to Value the Roller
Property at a Date When the Property Has Lost All
Value by Reason of the Plaintiff's Restrictive
Ordinances.

In this case, as in Friberg, the landowner can only be
justly compensated if his property is valued on the actual date
of taking rather than on the date of service of process.

On Sep-

tember 24, 1981, the plaintiff's Ordinance 81-1 precluded any
reasonable use of the Rollers' property and caused a complete
loss of value.

The plaintiff first devalued the Rollers' prop-

erty by regulatory restrictions and then five years later commenced this legal action.

The appraisers testified and by affi-

davit testified that the value of the property in 1981 was
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In State Road Commn. v. District Court, 78 P.2d 502
(Utah 1938), the State Road Commission was about to build a viaduct that would deprive the landowner of convenient access to his
property.

The proposed viaduct would also darken the street in

front of the landowner's property and deprive him of lightf air
and view.

The Supreme Court held that Article 1 S 22 of the Utah

Constitution had been carefully worded to include compensation
for "damage" to property as well as "taking" of property; that
wording was designed to "protect the damaged property owner
equally with the property owner whose land was physically entered
upon."

Id. at 508.
The Court reaffirmed all the principles enunciated in

Stockdale and held that "a party, whose property is about to be
specially damaged in any substantial degree for public use, has
the same rights and is given the same remedies for the protection
of his property from the threatened injury as would be accorded
him if his property were actually taken and appropriated for such
use."

Id. at 506.
E.

Depriving an Owner of Beneficial Use of Property
Constitutes a Compensable Taking.

As recently as 1981, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed
its position that deprivation of beneficial use is the standard
by which to measure a taking.

In Sweetwater Properties, SBC v.

Town of Alta, 622 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah 1981) the court held that
a policy declaration was not a taking because it did not deprive
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people alone to bear public burdens that should be borne by the
public as a whole,
B.

id. at 688 fn.4.

Defendants Are Entitled to Damages for the
Period 1981 to the Present.

The United States Supreme Court has decided the very
question that is before this Court. This Court must decide
whether a landowner may recover damages from the time that the
regulation constituted a taking of his property.

The Supreme

Court answered that question on June 9, 1987 in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
96 L.Ed.2d 250, 258 (June 9, 1982) (copy of case, R. 464). The
Court held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments required compensation for the period between the time the regulation took
effect and the time the taking was officially acknowledged.
The Lutheran Church owned a campground with bunkhouses
and other buildings along a creek in the Angeles National Forest.
Following a forest fire, a storm overflowed the banks of the
creek, flooded the campground and destroyed the buildings.

Los

Angeles County responded to the flood by enacting Interim Ordinance No. 11,855.

The ordinance restricted all building within

the flood protection area, which included part of the campground.
The Lutheran Church argued that Ordinance 11,855 denied
it all use of its campground.

The Supreme Court, considering

that argument, quoted the rule that property may be regulated to
a certain extent, but if regulation goes too far, it will be
-34-

recognized as a taking even though there are no formal proceedings.

Id. at 264-65.

The Court then held that "where the

government's activities have already worked a taking of all use
of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve
it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective."

Id.

at 268.

The Court recognized the far-reaching consequences of
its decision.

It wrote that its holding would lessen the freedom

and flexibility of municipalities in enacting
land-use-regulations, but that such consequences "necessarily
flow from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional
right."

Id,.

Defendants1 claim of Constitutional right requires

that the general public pay the price of watershed protection by
valuing the Rollers property on the day before Cornish passed an
ordinance stripping the property of all value.

A determination

of the 1981 date of taking would substantially increase the fair
market value of the property.

Defendants were prohibited by

order of the Court from presenting any evidence as to the ordinances or the fair market value of the property prior to July 26,
1986, the date of service of summons in this proceeding.

IY
WHETHER MINERAL RIGHTS ARE COMPENSABLE AS PART
OF JUST COMPENSATION
Plaintiff's Complaint, the Amended Complaint, the
Motion for Immediate Occupancy and the proceeding and hearing for
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immediate occupancy all required of defendants a taking of their
property in fee simple.

Even when plaintiff was specifically

asked about a taking of all mineral rights prior to the Summons
and Complaint and in the hearing for immediate occupancy, plaintiff responded, emphatically, that the taking in fee simple was
absolutely necessary and that the taking in fee simple included
all mineral rights to the property.

The town's Ordinance 85-4

authorizing condemnation required a taking in fee simple.
The Order of Immediate Occupancy to the property
required the taking the property in fee simple title including
all mineral rights.

Plaintiff having tendered to the Court 75%

of the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property, left defendants with the only issue for consideration,
defendants' "claim for greater compensation."

(Section 78-34-9,

U.C., 1987-88).
Defendants prepared their defense and the evidence and
expert testimony to sustain their burden of proof for greater
compensation based upon the final amended complaint and Order of
Occupancy each of which required the valuation of underlying mineral interests as part of the claim for title to the property in
fee simple.
After empanelment of the Jury and prior to opening
statements defendants, as the party with the burden of proof,
reviewed with the Court their intent to present to the jury in
opening statement the issue of valuation of mineral rights. (Tr.
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Vol* 1 at 1)

Plaintiff immediately upon oral petition moved to

amend its Complaint for the second time, to abandon and waive its
claim for title to the property in fee simple and to make a new
claim for condemnation pursuant to Section 78-34-2(1), U.C.,
1987-88. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 7)
"The following is a classification of the estates
and rights in lands subject to be taken for public use:
(1) A fee simple when taken for . . . reservoirs
and dams . . .; provided that where surface ground is
underlaid with minerals, coal or other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface ground over
such deposits.
(2) An easement, when taken for any other purpose
it

. . .

Plaintiff thereafter claimed a right to a "perpetual
easement" only.

The trial court allowed the abandonment of claim

for fee simple interest in the property and permitted the amendment of a claim for perpetual easement, over defendants1 objections and prohibited defendants from presenting to the jury the
issue of valuation of mineral rights. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 77 and Vol.
II at 11)

The trial court further overruled defendants1 objec-

tions that pursuant to statute, plaintiff had amended its claim
to an easement interest only and not a perpetual easement over
the surface ground over such deposits.
In State Dept. of Highways v. Wooley, 696 P.2d 828
(Colo. 1984).

The Colorado court held that the condemning

authority must declare in its petition the nature of the taking
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so that the landowner can accurately evaluate the damages to be
incurred.
"The purpose of a taking of land and water rights by a
city for water supply purposes fixes the extent of the
rights reasonably necessary to exercise the title
acquired. The government must commit itself as to what
is taken and as to what remains untaken, and that which
remains untaken continues vested in the owner." See
also 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 451.
It has been held that where land is taken to protect a
water supply from pollution, the condemnor is entitled to exclusive possession of the land.

Divided control over the land is

incompatible with the taking of lands for a water supply.

Barnes

v. Peck, 187 N.E. 176, (Mass., 1933); Flaqq v. Concord, 111 N.E.
369 (Mass., 1916).
The taking of fee title is a taking of the entire title
and necessarily includes all lesser estates including underlying
minerals.

30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 450. Meriwether v. Gulf

Oil Corp., 298 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1956).

The fee simple title to

the land acquired included all interests in the property and the
land owner did not retain mineral rights in the property.
In Springfield v. City of Perry, 358 P.2d 846 (Okla.,
1961), the city had condemned land for water works purposes.

The

Court held that condemnation proceedings resulted in acquisition
of fee simple title to land including the mineral estate in view
of the language of the pleadings.

In Kansas Power & Light Co. v.

Richie, 722 P.2d 1120 (Kan. App. 1986), the court held that if
the intended use excludes rights of the underlying interest
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holder, then value of mineral rights must be considered in determining just compensation.

In Wymo Fuels, Inc. v. Edwards, 723

P.2d 1230 (Wyo., 1986), the court held that the subservient
estate retained only such incidents of ownership as were not
inconsistent with plaintiff's dominent estate.

Since plaintiff

contends that the mining of minerals wold be inconsistent with
their right to a protective zone, plaintiff must pay for the mineral interests underlying those protective zones.
In Wm. E. Russell Coal Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County, 270 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1954), the land
owner claimed coal interest underlying the property and that
removal of those mineral interests would impair support of the
surface easement acquired for a highway.

Therefore, the land

owner should be compensated for that underlying mineral interest.
The Court held that the jury should determine the amount of damage resulting to a land owner of mineral interests and the jury
could not avoid determining the value of those mineral interests
because the municipality had determined that the servitude estate
was freed from liability because of a claim for surface rights
only.

IY
WHETHER ABANDONMENT AT TRIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR FEE
SIMPLE GIVES RISE TO OBLIGATION TO PAY DEFENDANTS1 ATTORNEYS
FEES, EXPENSES AND COSTS.
State law specifically provides for an award of all
damages, costs and attorney's fees to defendants as follows:
-39-

Condemnor . . . may, at any time prior to final
payment . . . abandon the proceedings and cause the
action to be dismissed without prejudice, provided,
however, that as a condition of dismissal condemner
first compensate condemnee for all damages he has sustained and also reimburse him in full for all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by
condemnee because of the filing of the action by
condemner, including attorney's fees.
(78-34-16, U.C., 1988-89)
In April, 1984, by letter to Cornish Town, the town was
advised by its engineer that the State Division of Health did not
require that land be acquired as protection zone or that the land
be owned by Cornish.

(R. at 768)

On March 17, 1986, Cornish Town wrote to Mr. Roller
offering to purchase the property claimed to be necessary for
protection of the town's water supply.
On March 22, 1986, Mr. Roller responded to the inquiry
asking the town to indicate the exact location and size of their
proposed protection zone.

And, specifically, Mr. Roller asked

"How much control do you need over the areas in question?

Do you

need the oil and mineral rights?11 (R. at 778)
On June 25, 1986, the town made no written response to
the questions asked except an unsigned letter continuing an offer
to purchase Mr. Roller's property. (R. at 782)
On July 5, Mr. Roller responded in writing requesting
the answers to his questions by asking review the matters with
the town and its appraisers.

He further advised the town of the

issues raised in the Federal Farm Land Protection Act that
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specifically deals with the interest in lands that are being
acquired.

(R. at 783)
On July 14, 1986, Cornish Town made a "final offer to

purchase" and stated "(7) In order for Cornish to maintain effective control over the spring protection zones, it is imperative
that it obtain all rights to the land shown in the surveys."
(Emphasis added)

The letter further referred to the Utah Geolog-

ical & Mineral Survey which indicates the town was taking all
rights including any underlying mineral deposits of whatever nature. (R. at 784)
By Ordinance 85-4, the town authorized condemnation
proceedings to acquire defendants' property in fee simple.
In August, 1986, Cornish Town filed its Complaint for
acquisition of this property by Cornish Town.

In its Complaint

and its First Amended Complaint in Condemnation, paragraph 7
alleges "The Plaintiff seeks to acquire, in fee simple, all property and property rights of the defendants in the real property
described in Exhibit "A."

(Emphasis added)

On numerous occasions prior to hearing of Motion for
Immediate Occupancy, the defendants requested that plaintiff
recede from its demand for the taking of fee simple title to the
property and on each occasion the request was denied.
At the hearing for motion for immediate occupancy, the
town was specifically asked on the record if they demanded fee
simple to the land and the mineral rights (Hearing Tr. 469 &
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Trial Tr. 787). the specific response was that the demand in
condemnation was for all rights to the land, including mineral
rights, otherwise the town would be frustrated in establishing
its protection zones.
"Mr. Preston: One other issue, and I don't know
whether that's been addressed by the Court. Does the
fee simple taking here exclude or include oil rights?
"The Court: I don't know what their - I'd have to
"Mr. Burnett: Fee simple is fee simple, and the
whole purpose of the protection zones would be frustrated by having an oil rig on there.
"The Court: Well, what does your resolution provide? Are you looking for surface rights? You're
looking for fee simple surface rights, I know that.
"Mr. Burnett: We are, your honor and I'd have to
talk to our engineer and confirm that, because at this
point as a lay person I'd be a little concerned about
the purpose of the protection zone being frustrated by
giving away some sub-surface rights which would interfere with the whole purpose of the protection zone. I
think that's an issue that could be addressed later on
and not in an order of immediate occupancy.
The Order of Immediate Occupancy provided for the taking of the land in fee simple.
Defendants were then left with no further declaration
or clarification as to the intent of the town other than the
intent to demand and to acquire by condemnation the property in
fee simple including all mineral rights.

Defendants were then

forced to prepare their claim for just compensation based upon
the demands made by the town of Cornish for fee simple title to
the property and for all rights and interests in the property
including mineral rights.
The laws of the State provide:
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"The rights of just compensation for the land so
taken or damaged shall vest in the parties entitled
thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and
awarded as provided in section 78-34-10 . . ."
(78-34-9, U.C., '1988-89)
Section 79-8-10 provides that:
"The Court, jury or enforcee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to the
proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
(1) The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all improvements thereon appertaining to
the realty, and of each and every separate estate or
interest therein . . .
(5) As far as practicable, compensation must be
assessed for each source of damages separately."
(78-34-10, U.C., ' S a ^ ) (Emphasis added)
Defendants prepared their claims for damages and just
compensation to include the mineral rights taken and were prepared to present those claims at trial.
Defendants advised plaintiff that their mineral experts
would testify including Don Curry, Mineral Engineer, Pete Bunger,
Mineral Chemist and mineral broker and rebuttal witness Ken
Santini, Mineral Engineer, as needed.
A proffer of proof was made to the Court prior to opening arguments as to the issue of mineral rights and the values to
the underlying minerals included in the taking were valued in
amounts exceeding $38 million dollars.

Defendants also proffered

that removal of the minerals would not support the overlying surface rights claimed by plaintiff.
On February 9, 1988, plaintiff, for the first time,
decided that the town ws bound by Utah statutes and therefore
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plaintiff determined that Section 78-34-2, U.C., '88-89, did not
allow them to take fee simple to the Roller land and so plaintiff
orally petitioned the Court for leave to amend its Complaint a
second time and to allow the town of Cornish to abandon its claim
for mineral rights, to abandon its claim for fee simple and petitioned that the town be allowed to amend its Complaint to provide
that a taking be a perpetual easement only.
that motion.

The Court granted

(Tr. Vol. I at 10 and Vol. II at 15)

The town of Cornish in its own proposed Judgment of
Special Verdict admits to the abandonment of its claim to mineral
rights.
On February 9, 1988, plaintiff moved to amend its Complaint to request that a perpetual easement rather than
a fee simple may be taken over the surface ground of
the areas being acquired as protection zones, reservoir
and pump house sites and the non-tillable or dry
grazing-sidehill area above the pipeline as more fully
described in the amended complaint." (Emphasis added)
The town admitted that the motion for leave to amend to abandon
its claim for fee simple was made specifically because of defendants1 claim that the mineral rights were commercially valuable
and the town could not afford to purchase those mineral rights.
Defendants submitted their Affidavit of Fees, Expenses
and Costs incurred in preparation for the issue of value of mineral rights including legal fees of $16,840.40, costs advanced of
$1,551.27 (R. 835) and expenses of $19,747.61 (R. at 759).
This Court has considered and upheld the statutory
right of defendants to attorney's fees and costs when a condemnor
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abandons its claims in condemnation in Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 497 P.2d 629 (Utah, 1972),

In this case, the condemning

authority advised the Court in pre-trial that it intended to
withdraw its claim and dismiss its action and that defendant's
property was no longer needed for public use.

Because of

plaintiff's representations, the case was stricken from the trial
calendar.

The Supreme Court held that plaintiff had abandoned

its claims and that defendant had a right to recover fees and
costs.

No matter the fact that the claim was still of record and

had not been formally dismissed.
In the present action, plaintiff amended its Complaint
and abandoned its claim for fee simple title to the property and
abandoned the claim for mineral rights.

This Court has long held

that an amended complaint is a dismissal of claims and abandonment of claims in the complaint that are not raised in the
amended complaint.
"The law is overwhelming to the effect that when
an amended complaint, complete in and of itself is
filed, the former complaint is functus officio and cannot be used for any purpose."
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union 222
v. Motor Cargo, 530 P.2d 807 (1974).
When the claimant files an amended complaint, the
amendment abandons the former cause of action.

The original

pleading is considered abandoned and ceases to perform any function.

A claim raised in the Complaint and not raised in the
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Amended Complaint is therefore dismissed.

Fluke Capital & Man-

agement Service Co. v. Richmond, 724 P.2d 356 (Wash., 1986).
The proceedings in this action were to obtain fee simple title.

The action for fee simple title was abandoned by

amending the Complaint after the Jury was selected, and that
claim or action was dismissed by order of the Court that plaintiff could amend its Complaint after the commencement of trial to
assert a claim for perpetual easement only.

At the entry of an

Order of Immediate Occupancy, plaintiff knew that the defendants
were required to defend and carry the burden of proof of defendants' claim of greater value than the value indicted by
plaintiff s appraiser.
The abandonment and dismissal of their claim for fee
simple title to the property should give rise to the statutory
award to defendants of costs, expenses and attorney's fees.

The

Court denied the claim for fees and costs. (R. at 859)
These issues are exhaustingly treated in Annotation 92
A.L.R.2d 355 and 68 A.L.R.3d 610 (copy of annotation, R. at 870).
The fact that plaintiff abandoned only part of its
claim has been considered by a number of jurisdictions and each
of those courts have held that partial abandonment gives rise to
liability for attorney's fees, costs and expenses incurred as to
the portion of the claims that have been abandoned.

Akana v.

Felix, 261 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. Hawaii, 1958); Dept. of Public
Works v. Lauter, 153 N.E.2d 552 (111., 1958).
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People by Dept. of Transportation v. Northern Trust
Co., 376-M.E.2d 286 (111. App., 1978); Independent School District v. Gross, 190 N.W.2d 651 (Minn., 1973); State Dept. of Natural Resources v. Sellers, 237 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio, 1979); Atherton
v. State Conservation Commission, 203 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa, 1978).
The identical issues to the case at bar were considered
in Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 483 P.2d 1 (Calif.,
1971) (Copy of case, R. 846). In the initial complaint, the
irrigation district sought to condemn a fee interest in property
parcels designated 1, 2, 4 and 5 and the cattle grazing and
watering rights to 199.9 acres of land designated as parcel 3.
The district filed an amended complaint seeking a complete fee
interest in 117 acres in parcel 3 and dropped the demand for
grazing and water rights.

The amended complaint excluded the

claim for parcels 4 and 5 completely.

The trial court held that

the amended complaint constituted a partial abandonment and the
Supreme Court upheld that determination.
The California statute is the same requirement as the
Utah statute. It is designed to compensate a defendant for
expenses incurred in anticipation of an eminent domain proceeding, when the condemner declines to carry the proceeding through
to its conclusion.

When plaintiff amended its complaint, it

abandoned its efforts to acquire 82.9 acres in fee simple, and
attorneys' fees and costs should be awarded based upon the costs
incurred by defendants allocated to that portion of the
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proceeding.

A California case identical to the case at bar is

County of Kern v. Galatas, 200 Cal.App.2d 353f 19 Cal.Rept. 348
(Cal.App., 1962) (copy of case R. 865). The county abandoned its
claim for mineral rights and amended its complaint to take land
only and not the mineral rights by condemnation.

The court held

that defendant land owners were entitled to legal fees and costs
incurred as to the abandoned claims to condemn mineral rights.
The town demanded the right to condemn fee simple title
under section 78-34-1, U.C., f87-88, for a public use.

The

determination of what is a public use is a judicial determination, not just a legislative assertion, but a determination that
the fee simple title demanded was in fact a public use for which
the town had a right to condemn defendants1 property (see Pordova
v. City of Tucson, 494 P.2d 52 (Ariz. App., 1972).
The town determined that fee simple title was necessary
for protection and preservation for part of the town's water supply.

Such a determination is claimed to be a public use for

proper exercise of the power of eminent domain.

City of Tacoma

v. Welcher, 399 P.2d 330 (Wash., 1965).
The clear intent of the town in its claims was to
obtain fee simple title and such is presumed by statute when the
taking was for a public use and was the intent expressed in the
demand for taking.

Olsen v. Board of Education, 571 P.2d 1336

(Utah, 1977).
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In Elliott v. City of Guthrie, 725 P.2d 861 (Okla.,
1986), the Court held that when fee simple title was reasonably
necessary or requisite to the designated public use, and that
concurrent use of other interest owners of land was not desirable
because of the necessity of protecting the purity of the water
supply, then the designated fee simple title for public use would
take precedence over the mere easement right designated for
rights-of-way by the statute.
The town represented that a quantum of less than fee
simple would frustrate and destroy its intended use that being
the claim, the legislature intended the appropriation of the fee
"for all other public uses for the benefit of the . . . town."
78-34-1, U.C., '87-88.

Section 78-34-2 does not mandate a lesser

estate but classifies the estate or quantum to be taken unless
the condemning authority requires a greater estate for its
declared public purpose.

The Court foreclosed the provisions as

to the quantum of the estate or the public need and necessity
with its Order of Immediate Occupancy, leaving the defendants
with the burden of proving the value of their mineral interests
and the value of the land taken in fee simple.
V
WHETHER DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE OF THE
VALUE OF PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS VENTURE IN THE PROPERTY.
Defendants were prohibited from putting evidence to the
jury as to the retail value of hunting access permits to hunt
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deer on defendants1 property.

(Jury Instruction No. 28,R. 739,

Tr. Vol. I, at 80 & Vol. II at 91)
The loss of business potential may be introduced in
evidence to show a diminution of the highest and best use for the
property, not for the purpose of showing loss of profits or
income.
1970).

State ex rel Herman v. Schaffer, 467 P.2d 66 (Ariz.,
That was the specific reason for offering that evidence.

(Tr. at 86)

The loss of that business opportunity should be sub-

mitted to the jury just as the loss of grazing access was held to
be a proper claim for determining severance damages in State By
and Through Road Commission v. Larkin, 495 P.2d 817 (Utah, 1972).
The evidence that should be presented to the jury should be any
evidence which will aid the jury in fixing the fair market value
of the property.

It should not be merely speculation, but evi-

dence which would be considered by a prospective vendor or purchaser or which would tend to enhance or appreciate the value of
the property taken.

State v. Kunimoto, 617 P.2d 913 (Hawaii,

1980).
The future use for sale of hunting access permits is
reasonable evidence for probable future use, and competent evidence which would tend to show the value of that use should have
been admitted.

State By Attorney General v. Pioneer Mill Co.,

637 P.2d 1131 (Hawaii, 1981).

Evidence to show that certain

income producing use at the time of condemnation was reasonably
probable is admissible, and expert testimony as to a legitimate
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income stream from that future use should be admissible.

City &

County of Honolulu v. International Air Service Co., Inc., 628
F.2d 192 (Hawaii, 1981), and State Dept. of Highways v. Mahaffey,
697 P.2d 773 (Colo. App., 1984).
VI
WHETHER DEFENDANTS1 COSTS AWARDED SHOULD INCLUDE THE
COSTS OF PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF TRANSCRIPTS
AND EXHIBITS USED IN TRIAL.
Defendants petitioned an award of costs totalling
$2,252.65 (R. 833). Costs are generally allocable only in the
amount and in the manner provided by Statute.

The trial court

has the discretion in regard to the allowance of costs and has
the duty to guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing of
costs.

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah, 1980).
Rule 54(4)(1):
"Costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs. . . . "

The trial court may exercise reasonable discretion in regard to
the allowance of costs.

Costs are taxable in condemnation cases.

Sigurd City v.State, 142 P.2d 154 (Utah, 1943).
Costs means those fees which are required to be paid to
the Court and to witnesses.

The Court approves the costs of dep-

ositions as the taxing of costs and the costs of transcripts of
record should be equal thereto.

The same is also true in the

taxing of costs on appeal for the costs of the transcript of record.

The exhibits produced by defendants are necessarily
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required in condemnation proceedings when the property is not
personally viewed by the jury and the jury must visualize the
property through photographs and graphic exhibits.

Extraordinary

as these costs and expenses are, they are unique to the defendants1 burden of proving greater value, they are required because
of plaintiff's statutory right of condemnation, and should be
taxable as costs herein.
CONCLUSION
1.

Defendants have a right to have the issue of public

need and necessity determined by the jury.
2.

The appropriate and proper date of taking was the

regulatory taking by town Ordinance 81-1 in September, 1981.
3.

The Court's permitting amendment of Complaint and

prohibiting defendants from submitting the value of the underlying mineral rights to the jury should be reversed or remanded for
determination of the value of the mineral rights taken.
4.

Defendants have a right to an award of costs,

expenses and attorney's fees incurred after demand for title in
fee simple was abandoned by plaintiff.
5.

The defendants should be permitted to submit the

evidence of value of access permits for hunting to determine the
value of the highest and best use of the property.
6.

Defendants have a right to be awarded costs

incurred for photographs, graphic exhibits and transcripts of
preliminary hearings as a proper taxing of costs herein.
-52-

THEREFORE, the decision of the trial court should be
reversed and and the matters remanded for trial and further
determination consistent with this Court's determinations.
DATED this g ^

day of August, 1988.
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